"What is the Soul?" A commentary on Cardinal Collins’ Masterclass #4, by: Rembrandt
Plus Bibliography with PDF Links
THE ROSARY HOUR PODCAST NEWSLETTER [2nd Edition: 24/06/23]
“WHAT IS THE SOUL?”
A Commentary on Cardinal Collins’ Masterclass #4
by: Rembrandt
Cardinal Collins' account of the soul is traceable to Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 76.1 Aquinas, in turn, draws upon on Aristotle's De Anima II, 2. Collins' starting point is that body and soul are inherently inseparable.
In this section of De Anima, Aristotle introduces the hierarchical nature of soul: rational (intellect), sensitive (perception, locomotion) and vegetative (basic principle of life). Cardinal Collins stresses this last principle, because it is what all three have in common.
Regarding the soul, Aristotle uses the term ‘form for the general principle by which matter is organised. ‘Soul’ is the form specific to living things:
"the soul is that by which we first and foremost assimilate nourishment (nutrimur), have sensory cognition (sentimus), and move from place to place (movemur secundum locum); and, similarly, the soul is that by which we first and foremost have intellective understanding (intelligimus). Therefore, this principle by which we first and foremost have intellective understanding—regardless of whether it is called the intellect or the intellective soul—is the form of the body.” Summa, I Respond).
Aquinas' reference for this passage is Aristotle's De Anima ii, 2)2, where it is written that form is act or actuality; matter, independent of form, is only the potential to be what it becomes when in unity with its proper form. Aquinas demonstrates that matter and form, when a composite, constitute a principle of individuation, a principium individuationis, a unity distinct from other things:
"For given that form is actuality, whereas matter is being only in potentiality, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form can in its own right as a whole be the form of something else’". (Ibid.)
"The soul is not a principle of life trapped in the prison of a body", says Cardinal Collins, "the body and the soul are united". The Cardinal is using casual language, of course, but his source, by virtue of his education, would ultimately have been Aristotle, who says that matter is potential and form is act and actuality:
"the actuality (energeia) of each thing comes naturally about in that which is already such potentially and in its appropriate matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality and principle (logos) of that which has the potentiality to be such." (Ibid.)
The term “principle” translates Aristotle’s term, logos, which has a very broad range of meanings. In this context, logos conveys that the soul’s quality of being inherently ordered or possessed of lawful arrangement. Logos is to appear later in the Greek language Prologue to the Gospel of John to denote the Logos Incarnate; or, to be consistent with the present context, the Incarnation of the Order of the Universe.
Regarding actuality or energeia, the form of a thing, or the soul of a living body is dynamic; form actuates when it unites with the potential inherent in the matter proper to it.
Also significant in this last quotation, the soul unites only with matter properly ordered to it. To give Aristotle's description its rightful nuance, the soul belongs to a body which has an entelechy (an end) suited to its form. Stated negatively, matter does not possess equipotentiality, which, for example, would leave it open to chance rather than order.
Cardinal Collins stresses the inseparability of the soul from the body, even though it does, in fact, separate from the body at death. Aristotle is equivocal in this section as to the extent of the separability of soul from matter:
"Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation the situation is not so far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of soul [than that of plants confined to the principle is life and the insects where there is sense-perception], and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting can from the perishable." (De Anima II, 2, p. 14)
Cardinal Collins, however, points to the soul and body uniting after death. Within what must have been the time limits of the video, he makes the most basic point apparent: the body always belongs to the soul even after separation in death. Thomas Aquinas explains it this way with a metaphor:
"It is fitting for the soul in its own right to be united to the body, in the same way that it is fitting for a lightweight body to be high up. And just as a lightweight body remains lightweight when separated from its proper place and retains its aptitude for, and inclination toward, its proper place, so too the human soul remains in its esse [state or condition] when it has been separated from its body—even while retaining its natural aptitude for, and inclination toward, union with the body." (Summa, Reply to Objection 6)
That the soul is still inclined to unity with the body after death can only be inferred from Aristotle; for, since matter is suited to its form by virtue of its entelechy (inherently in possession of an end), the soul, "in its own right" must seek the body suited to it, even Thomas outlines it above Objection 6.
The Cardinal hints at the reuniting of the soul with the body at the resurrection. Perhaps he was also thinking of St. Paul here. Leaving that aside, according to Aquinas the soul does not lose its inclination to the body after death.
On the other hand, says Thomas,
"[b]ecause of its perfection, the human soul is not a form that is immersed in corporeal matter or entirely encompassed (totaliter comprehensa) by it". (Ibid., Reply to Objection 4)
Also,
"The soul communicates the esse [state or condition] in which it itself subsists to the corporeal matter that, along with the intellective soul, makes up a single entity, with the result that the esse that belongs to the whole composite is also the esse of the soul itself. This is not the case with other forms that are not subsistent. And it is for this reason that the human soul, but not other forms, remains in its own esse after its body has been destroyed." (Ibid., Reply to Objection 5)
That the soul subsists in its esse means that it exists essentially in its own state or condition and not merely as part of it, as though there were other parts that exist outside of it. Thus, the soul communicates itself wholly and entirely to the corporeal matter to make a composite entity.
While this material may appear abstract, there is an enormous practical wisdom in it which stands the test of time because it allows us to confront situations which could not have been anticipated by Aristotle or Aquinas. It is precisely this unity of body and soul which prompts Cardinal Collins to notice the elephant in the room. After explaining, in effect, that he does not wish to hurt anyone's feelings, he goes on to insist: "But the fact is, you can't have ... a man say my inner soul tells me I'm a woman".
Here the Cardinal is describing an essentially Schizophrenic condition where the body is felt as a "shell", which "really isn't me". Collins assessment comes remarkably close to describing the severely alienated and schizophrenic condition which the Scottish Psychiatrist, R.D. Laing, analysed in his book, The Divided Self (1965).3
The Cardinal Collins finds philosophical precedents for this division in Plato and Descartes. Philosophers reflect cultural trends and even anticipate them.
The foregoing summary of the soul from Aristotle to St. Thomas came to be the usage in the Church. That is an important part of our tradition.
Accordingly, and by way of example, through Thomas Aquinas, Aristotelian language ---such as matter, form, potential, act (actuality), substance, accident--- became the unique idiom making possible the conveyance of certain truths regarding transubstantiation, notwithstanding the persistent element of mystery.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aquinas, Saint Thomas, "Question 76. The Union of Body and Soul. "Notre Dame University: https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques76.pdf
Hamlyn, D. W., Aristotle's De Anima Books II and II. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) University of Exeter: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/sp344/0198240848%20-%20De%20Anima%20Books%20II%20and%20III%20(With%20Passages%20From%20Book%20I)%20-%20Aristotle,%20Christopher%20Shields,%20D.%20W.%20Hamlyn.pdf
Laing, R.D., The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Rembrandt is a writer for Travessa Da Senra House Press (Porto, Portugal). In May 2022, he contributed his reflections on Saint Pope John Paul II’s exploration of the definition of "Immaculate Conception" as per Pius IX (19 June 1996, page 11 in L'Osservatore Romano) forThe Rosary Hour Podcast Newsletter™.
He is our most senior columnist, advisor and contributor who studied at St. Michael's College, Toronto, Canada, in a degree-granting programme attached to St. Augustine's Seminary. He was educated by the Basilians, throughout high school, and even had Basilian professors at the University of Windsor.
After his graduate work, he taught social sciences at the post-secondary level and furthered his studies in the German language in Germany and Switzerland. He continues to research, write articles and translate papers in his retirement.
